The Curious Case of The Illinois Trump Delegates

Intro

This past Wednesday, after watching Hillary Clinton slow-motion strut into the Broad City universe and realizing that this election has successfully seeped into even the most intimate of personal rituals, I planned to go to sleep without thinking any more about the current presidential race. However, somewhere in between Ilana’s final “yas queen” and hitting the pillow, I saw David Wasserman’s FiveThirtyEight article “Trump Voters’ Aversion To Foreign-Sounding Names Cost Him Delegates.”

Like many readers I was immediately drawn to the piece’s fundamentally ironic implication that Trump could have lost delegates in Illinois due to the very racial resentment that he espouses and even encourages among his supporters. The possibility that this could be more deeply investigated was an energizing idea, which had already inspired Evan Soltas to do just that as well as make public his rich-in-applications-and-possibilities dataset. With this dataset in hand, I tried my hand at complementing the ideas from the Wasserman and Soltas articles by building some visual evidence. (Suffice it to say I did not end up going to sleep for a while.)

To contribute to the meaningful work that the two articles have completed, I will first quickly outline their scope and conclusions, and then present the visuals I’ve built using Soltas’ publicly available data. Consider this a politically timely exercise in speedy R scripting!

Wasserman’s FiveThirtyEight piece & Soltas’ blog post

In the original article of interest, Wasserman discusses the noteworthy Illinois Republican primary. He explains that,

Illinois Republicans hold a convoluted “loophole” primary: The statewide primary winner earns 15 delegates, but the state’s other 54 delegates are elected directly on the ballot, with three at stake in each of the state’s 18 congressional districts. Each campaign files slates of relatively unknown supporters to run for delegate slots, and each would-be delegate’s presidential preference is listed beside his or her name.

Given that the delegates are “relatively unknown,” one would assume that delegates in the same district who list the same presidential preference would earn similar numbers of votes. However, surprisingly, Wasserman found that this did not seem to be the case for Trump delegates. In fact, there is a striking pattern in the Illinois districts with the 12 highest vote differentials: “[i]n all 12 cases, the highest vote-getting candidate had a common, Anglo-sounding name” while “a majority of the trailing candidates had first or last names most commonly associated with Asian, Hispanic or African-American heritages.” These findings, while admittedly informal, strongly suggest that Trump supporters are racially biased in their delegate voting behaviors.

Soltas jumps into this discussion by first creating dataset on all 458 people who ran for Illinois Republican delegate spots. He merges data on the individuals’ names, districts, and candidate representation with a variable that could be described as a measure of perceived whiteness–the non-Hispanic white percentage of the individual’s last name, as determined from 2000 US Census data. The inclusion of this variable is what makes the dataset so exciting (!!!) since, as Soltas explains, this gives us an “objective measure to test the phenomenon Wasserman discovered.”

The article goes on to confirm the legitimacy of Wasserman’s hypothesis. In short, “Trump delegates won significantly more votes when they had “whiter” last names relative to other delegates in their district” and this type of effect does not exist for the other Republicans.

Visual evidence time

I now present a few visuals I generated using the aforementioned dataset to see Soltas’ conclusions for myself. First things first, it’s important to note that some grand underlying mechanism does not jump out at you when you simply look at the association between perceived whiteness and vote percentage for all of Trump’s Illinois delegates:

fig1

The above graph does not suggest any significant relationship between these two numbers attached to each individual delegate. This is because the plot shows delegates across all different districts, which will vote for Trump at different levels, but compares their absolute variable levels. What we actually care about is comparing voting percentages within the same district, but across different individuals who all represent the same presidential hopeful. In other words, we need to think about the delegates relative to their district-level context. To do this, I calculate vote percentages and whiteness measures relative to the district: the percentage point difference between a Trump delegate’s vote|whiteness percentage and the average Trump delegate vote|whiteness percentage in that district. (Suggestions welcome on different ways of doing this for visualization’s sake!)

fig2

Now that we are measuring these variables (vote percentage and whiteness measure) relative to the district, there is a statistically significant association beyond even the 0.1% level. (The simple linear regression Y~X in this case yields a t-statistic of 5.4!) In the end, the interpretation of the simplistic linear regression is that a 10 percentage point increase in a Trump delegate’s perceived whiteness relative to the district yields a 0.12 percentage point increase in the delegate’s vote percentage relative to the district. (I’m curious if people think there is a better way to take district levels into account for these visuals–let me know if you have any thoughts that yield a simpler coefficient interpretation!)

The last dimension of this discussion requires comparing Trump to the other Republican candidates. Given the media’s endless coverage of Trump, I would not have been surprised to learn that this effect impacts other campaigns but just was never reported. But, Wasserman and Soltas argue that this is not the case. Their claims are further bolstered by the following visual, which recreates the most recent Trump plot for all 9 candidates who had sufficient data (excludes Gilmore, Huckabee, and  Santorum):

fig3

It should be immediately clear that Trump is the only candidate for whom there is a positive statistically significant association between the two relative measures. While Kasich has an upward sloping regression line, the corresponding 95% confidence interval demonstrates that the coefficient on relative perceived whiteness is not statistically significantly different from 0. Employing the whiteness measure in this context allows us to provide quantitative evidence for Wasserman’s original intuition that this effect is unique to Trump–thus, “lend[ing] credibility to the theory that racial resentment is commonplace among his supporters.”

The role of perceptions of whiteness

Wasserman’s article has incited an outpouring of genuine interest over the past few days. The fascinating nature of the original inquiry combined with Soltas’ integration of a perceived whiteness measure into the Illinois delegate dataset provides a perfect setting in which to investigate the role racial resentment is playing in these particular voting patterns, and in the election on the whole.

Code

My illinois_delegates Github repo has the R script and csv file necessary to replicate all three visuals! (We know data, we have the best data.)


© Alexandra Albright and The Little Dataset That Could, 2016. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts, accompanying visuals, and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Alex Albright and The Little Dataset That Could with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

 

This Post is Brought to You by the National Science Foundation

Intro

I have officially finished applying for my PhD. While the application process included many of the same elements that I had previously encountered as a fresh-faced* 17-year-old (think standardized testing without the #2 pencils and lots more button clicking), I am no longer applying as a (relatively) blank slate–a future liberal arts student who will float and skip between disciplines until being neatly slotted into a major. Instead, we PhD applicants have already zeroed in on a particular area of study–in my case, economics. Consequently, each PhD discipline is unlikely to exhibit the same carefully crafted demographics boasted in the pie charts that plaster undergraduate brochures across the country to provide tangible evidence for optimistic, bolded statements about diversity. In formulating responses to a slew of university-specific prompts about diversity in “the sciences,” I grew curiouser and curiouser about two particular questions: What do demographic compositions look like across various PhD disciplines in the sciences? & Have demographic snapshots changed meaningfully over time?

As I continued working to imbue a sense of [academic] self into pdfs composed of tightly structured Times New Roman 12 point font, I repeatedly found myself at the NSF open data portal, seeking to answer these aforementioned questions. However, I would then remind myself that, despite my organic urge to load rows and columns into R Studio, I should be the responsible adult (who I know I can be) and finish my applications before running out to recess. Now that the last of the fateful buttons have been clicked (and a sizable portion of my disposable income has been devoured by application fees and the testing industrial complex), I’m outside and ready to talk science!**

NSF data and sizes of “the sciences”

In this post, I am focusing on the demographics of science PhD degrees awarded as they pertain to citizenship and race/ethnicity, but not gender. In an ideal world, I would be able to discuss the compositions of PhD fields as broken into race/ethnicity-gender combinations, however, the table that includes these types of combinations for US citizens and permanent residents (Table 7-7) only provides the numbers for the broader categories rather than for the desired discipline-level. For instance, social science numbers are provided for 2002-2012 without specific numbers for economics, anthropology, etc. This approach, therefore, would not allow for an investigation into the main topic of interest, which is the demographic differences between the distinct disciplines–there is too much variety within the larger umbrella categories to discuss the fields’ compositions in this way. Therefore, I limit this discussion to demographics with respect to citizenship and race/ethnicity and, accordingly, use Table 7-4 “Doctoral degrees awarded, by citizenship, field, and race or ethnicity: 2002–12” from the NSF Report on Women, Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering*** as my data source.

Before getting into the different PhD science fields and their demographics, it’s worth noting the relative sizes of these disciplines. The following treemap depicts the relative sizes of the sciences as defined by NSF data on doctoral degrees awarded in 2012:

treemap2

The size of each squarified rectangle represents the number of degrees awarded within a given field while the color denotes the field’s parent category, as defined by the NSF. (Note that some studies are, in fact, their own parent categories. This is the case for Biological Sciences, Psychology, Computer Sciences, and Agricultural Sciences.) In the upcoming discussion of demographics, we will first discuss raw numbers of degrees earned and the relevant demographic components but will then pivot towards a discussion of percentages, at which point remembering the differences in size will be particularly helpful in piecing together the information into one cohesive idea of the demographics of “the sciences.”****

A decade of demographic snapshots: PhD’s in the sciences

The NSF data specifies two levels of information about the doctoral degrees awarded. The first level identifies the number of degree recipients who are US citizens or permanent residents as well as the number who are temporary residents. Though “[t]emporary [r]esident includes all ethnic and racial groups,” the former category is further broken down into the following subgroups: American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, Hispanic, Other or unknown, and White. In our first exploration of the data, we specify the raw number of degrees awarded to individuals in the specific ethnic and racial categories for US citizens and permanent residents as well as the number awarded to temporary residents. In particular, we start the investigation with the following series of stacked area charts (using flexible y-axes given the vastly different sizes of the disciplines):

raw_plot

In this context and for all following visualizations, the red denotes temporary residents while all other colors (the shades of blue-green and black) are ethnic and racial subsets of the US citizens and permanent residents. By illustrating the raw numbers, this chart allow us to compare the growth of certain PhD’s as well as seeing the distinct demographic breakdowns. While overall the number of science PhD’s increased by 39% from 2002 to 2012, Astronomy, Computer Science, Atmospheric sciences, and Mathematics and statistics PhD’s clearly outpaced other PhD growth rates with increases of 143%, 125% 84%, and 80%, respectively. Meanwhile, the number of Psychology PhD’s actually decreased from 2002 to 2012  by 8%. While this was the only science PhD to experience a decline over the relevant 10-year period, a number of other disciplines grew at modest rates. For instance, the number of Anthropology, Sociology, and Agricultural Sciences PhD’s experienced increases of 15%, 16%, and 18% between 2002 and 2012, which pale in comparison to the vast increases seen in Astronomy, Computer Science, Atmospheric sciences, and Mathematics and statistics.

While it is tempting to use this chart to delve into the demographics of the different fields of study, the use of raw numbers renders a comprehensive comparison of the relative sizes of groups tricky. For this reason, we shift over to visualizations using percentages to best get into the meat of the discussion–this also eliminates the need for different y-axes. In presenting the percentage demographic breakdowns, I supply three different visualizations: a series of stacked area graphs, a series of nightingale graphs (essentially, polar stacked bar charts), and a series of straightforward line graphs, which despite being the least exciting/novel are unambiguous in their interpretation:

percent_area

perc_nightingale

perc_line

One of my main interests in these graphs is the prominence of temporary residents in various disciplines. In fact, it turns out that Economics is actually quite exceptional in terms of its percentage of temporary residents, which lingers around 60% for the decade at hand and is at 58% for 2012. (In 2012, out of the remaining 42% that are US citizens or permanent residents, 70% are white, 11% are asian or pacific islander, 3% are black, 3% are hispanic, 0% are american indian or alaskan native, and 13% are other or unknown.) Economics stands with Computer science, Mathematics and statistics, and Physics as one of the four subjects in the sciences for which temporary residents made up a higher percentage of the PhD population than white US citizens or permanent residents consistently from 2002 to 2012. Furthermore, Economics is also the science PhD with the lowest percentage of white US citizens and permanent residents–that is, a mere 30%.  In this sense, the field stands out as wildly different in these graphs from its social science friends (or, more accurately, frenemies). On another note, it is also not hard to immediately notice that Psychology, which is not a social science in the NSF’s categorization, is so white that its nightingale graph looks like an eye with an immensely overly dilated pupil (though anthropology is not far behind on the dilated pupil front).

Also readily noticeable is the thickness of the blue hues in the case of Area and ethnic studies–an observation that renders it undeniable that this subject is the science PhD with the highest percentage of non-white US citizens and permanent residents. Following this discipline would be the other social sciences Anthropology, Sociology, and Political science and public administration, as well as the separately categorized Psychology. However, it is worth noting that the ambiguity of the temporary residents’ racial and ethnic attributes leaves much of our understanding of the prominence of various groups unclear.

Another focal point of this investigation pertains to the time dimension of these visuals. When homing in on the temporal aspect of these demographic snapshots, there is a discouraging pattern–a lack of much obvious change. This is especially highlighted by the nightingale graphs since the polar coordinates allow the 2012 percentages to loop back next to the 2002 percentages and, thus, facilitate for a simple start-to-end comparison. In most cases, the two points in time look incredibly similar. Of course, this does not necessarily mean there has been no meaningful change. For instance, there have been declines in the percentage of white US citizens and permanent residents in the subjects Area and ethnic studies, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, and Political science and public administration, which have then been offset by increases in other groups of individuals. However, the picture is incredibly stagnant for most of the disciplines, especially the hard sciences and the unusually quantitative social science of economics. In pairing the stagnant nature of these demographic snapshots with consistent calls for greater faculty diversity in the wake of campus protests, it is clear that there is a potential bottleneck since such lagging diversity in PhD disciplines can directly contribute to a lack of diversity at the faculty-level.

Endnote

When the public discusses the demographics and diversity of “the sciences,” 1.5 dozen disciplines are being improperly blended together into generalized statements. To better understand the relevant dynamics, individuals should zero in on the discipline-level rather than refer to larger umbrella categories. As it turns out according to our investigation, the demographic breakdowns of these distinct subjects are as fundamentally different as their academic methodologies–methodologies which can be illustrated by the following joke that I can only assume is based on a true story:

As a psychological experiment, an engineer, a chemist, and a theoretical economist are each locked in separate rooms and told they won’t be released until they paint their entire room. They are each given a can of blue paint which holds about half the paint necessary to paint the room and then left alone. A few hours later the psychologist checks up on the three subjects.

(1) The engineer’s walls are completely bare. The engineer explains that he had worked out that there wasn’t enough paint to cover all the walls so he saw no point in starting.

(2) The chemist’s room is painted in faded, streaky blue. “There wasn’t enough paint, so I diluted it,” she explains.

(3) In the economist’s room, the floor and the ceiling are completely blue, and there’s a full can of paint still sitting on the floor. The experimenter is shocked and asks how the economists managed to paint everything. The economist explains, “Oh, I just painted the rational points.”

And with an unwavering appreciation for that bit, I hope to be one of the ~20-30 (who knows?) % of white US citizens/permanent residents in the economics PhD cohort of 2021.

PS-Happy 2016 everyone!

Footnotes

* I had yet to take a driving test at a DMV. I did this successfully at age 21. But, I will not drive your car.

** The NSF divides subjects up into S&E (science and engineering) and non-S&E categories. In this context, I am only discussing the subjects that fall under the umbrella of science. It would be simple to extend the approach and concept to the provided numbers for engineering.

*** This table explains that the exact source for this information is: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, special tabulations of U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, Completions Survey, 2002–12.

**** In particular, the tiny size of the group of History of Science PhD’s allows for much more variability year-to-year in terms of demographics. Only 19-34 degrees were given out on an annual basis from 2002-2012. In this case, size of the program is responsible for the wildly evident changes in demographic composition.

Code

Data and R scripts necessary to replicate visualizations are now up on my github! See the NSF_Demographics repo. Let me know if you have any questions or issues with the R script in particular.

Further directions for work
  • Create gif of treemap using years 2002-2012 to replace the static version for just 2012
    • Or use a slider via some D3 magic
  • Follow-up by comparing the gender compositions
  • Look into the development and change history of the US Office of Management and Budget for racial and ethnic categories
    • Just curious as to the timeline of changes and how categorization changes affect our available data

© Alexandra Albright and The Little Dataset That Could, 2016. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts, accompanying visuals, and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Alex Albright and The Little Dataset That Could with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

The Rise of the New Kind of Cabbie: A Comparison of Uber and Taxi Drivers

Intro

One day back in the early 2000’s, I commandeered one of my mom’s many spiral notebooks. I’d carry the notebook all around Manhattan, allowing it to accompany me everywhere from pizza parlors to playgrounds, while the notebook waited eagerly for my parents to hail a taxicab so it could fulfill its eventual purpose. Once in a cab, after clicking my seat belt into place (of course!), I’d pull out the notebook in order to develop one of my very first spreadsheets. Not the electronic kind, the paper kind. I made one column for the date of the cab ride, another for the driver’s medallion number (5J31, 3A37, 7P89, etc.) and one last one for the driver’s full name–both the name and number were always readily visible, pressed between two slabs of Plexiglas that intentionally separate the back from the front seat. Taxi drivers always seemed a little nervous when they noticed I was taking down their information–unsure of whether this 8-year-old was planning on calling in a complaint about them to the Taxi and Limousine Commission. I wasn’t planning on it.

Instead, I collected this information in order to discover if I would ever ride in the same cab twice…which I eventually did! On the day that I collected duplicate entries in the second and third columns, I felt an emotional connection to this notebook as it contained a time series of yellow cab rides that ran in parallel with my own development as a tiny human. (Or maybe I just felt emotional because only children can be desperate for friendship, even when it’s friendship with a notebook.) After pages and pages of observations, collected over the years using writing implements ranging from dull pencils to thick Sharpies, I never would have thought that one day yellow cabs would be eclipsed by something else…

Something else

However, today in 2015, according to Taxi and Limousine Commission data, there are officially more Uber cars in New York City than yellow cabs! This is incredible not just because of the speed of Uber’s growth but also since riding with Uber and other similar car services (Lyft, Sidecar) is a vastly different experience than riding in a yellow cab. Never in my pre-Uber life did I think of sitting shotgun. Nor did I consider starting a conversation with the driver. (I most definitely did not tell anyone my name or where I went to school.) Never did my taxi driver need to use an iPhone to get me to my destination. But, most evident to me is the distinction between the identities of the two sets of drivers. It is undoubtedly obvious that compared to traditional cab service drivers, Uber drivers are younger, whiter, more female, and more part-time. Though I have continuously noted these distinctions since growing accustomed to Uber this past summer, I did not think that there was data for illustrating these distinctions quantitatively. However, I recently came across the paper “An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States,” written by (Economists!) Jonathan Hall and Alan Krueger. The paper supplies tables that summarize characteristics of both Uber drivers and their conventional taxi driver/chauffeur counterparts. This allows for an exercise in visually depicting the differences between the two opposing sets of drivers—allowing us to then accurately define the characteristics of a new kind of cabbie.  

The rise of the younger cabbie
age

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Visualization made using ggplot2.

The above figure illustrates that Uber drivers are noticeably younger than their taxi counterparts. (From here on, when I discuss taxis I am also implicitly including chauffeurs. If you’d like to learn more about the source of the data and the collection methodology, refer directly to the paper.) For one, the age range including the highest percentage of Uber drivers is the 30-39 range (with 30.1% of drivers) while the range including the highest percentage of taxi drivers is the 50-64 range (with 36.6% of drivers). While about 19.1% of Uber drivers are under 30, only about 8.5% of taxi drivers are this young. Similarly, while only 24.5% of Uber drivers are over 50, 44.3% of taxi drivers are over this threshold. This difference in age is not very surprising given that Uber is a technological innovation and, therefore, participation is skewed to younger individuals.

The rise of the more highly educated cabbie
educ

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Visualization made using ggplot2.

This figure illustrates that Uber drivers, on the whole, are more highly educated than their taxi counterparts. While only 12.2% of Uber drivers do not possess a level of education beyond high school completion, the majority of taxi drivers (52.5%) fall into this category. The percentage of taxi drivers with at least a college degree is a mere 18.8%, but the percentage of Uber drivers with at least a college degree is 47.7%, which is even higher than that percentage for all workers, 41.1%. Thus, Uber’s rise has created a new class of drivers whose higher education level is superior to that of the overall workforce. (Though it is worth noting that the overall workforce boasts a higher percentage of individuals with postgraduate degrees than does Uber–16% to 10.8%.)

The rise of the whiter cabbie
race

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Visualization made using ggplot2.

On the topic of race, conventional taxis boast higher percentages of all non-white racial groups except for the “Other Non-Hispanic” group, which is 3.9 percentage points higher among the Uber population. The most represented race among taxi drivers is black, while the most represented race among Uber drivers is white. 19.5% of Uber drivers are black while 31.6% of taxi drivers are black, and 40.3% of Uber drivers are white while 26.2% of taxi drivers are white. I would be curious to compare the racial breakdown of Uber’s drivers to that of Lyft and Sidecar’s drivers as I suspect the other two might not have populations that are as white (simply based on my own small and insufficient sample size).

The rise of the female cabbie
gender

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Visualization made using ggplot2.

It has been previously documented how Uber has helped women begin to “break into” the taxi industry. While only 1% of NYC yellow cab drivers are women and 8% of taxis (and chauffeurs) as a whole are women, an impressive 14% of Uber drivers are women–a percentage that is likely only possible in the driving industry due to the safety that Uber provides via the information on its riders.

The rise of the very-part-time cabbie
hours

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Visualization made using ggplot2.

A whopping 51% of Uber drivers drive a mere 1-15 hours per week though only 4% of taxis do so. This distinction in driving times between the two sets of drivers makes it clear that Uber drivers are more likely to be supplementing other sources of income with Uber work, while taxi drivers are more likely to be working as a driver full-time (81% of taxis drive more than 35 hours a week on average, but only 19% of Uber drivers do so). In short, it is very clear that Uber drivers treat driving as more of a part-time commitment than do traditional taxi drivers.

Uber by the cities

As a bonus, beyond profiling the demographic and behavioral differences between the two classes of drivers, I present some information about how Uber drivers differ city by city. While this type of comparison could also be extremely interesting for demographic data (gender, race, etc.), hours worked and earnings are the only available pieces of information profiled by city in Hall and Krueger (2015).

Uber by the cities: hours
cities

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Data on uberX drivers for October 2014. Visualization made using ggplot2.

New York is the city that possesses the least part-time uberX drivers. (Note: This data is only looking at hours worked for uberX drivers in October 2014.) Only 42% work 1-15 hours while the percentage for the other cities ranges from 53-59%. Similarly, 23% of NYC Uber drivers work 35+ hours while the percentage for other cities ranges from 12-16%. Though these breakdowns are different for each of the six cities, the figure illustrates that Uber driving is treated pretty uniformly as a part-time gig throughout the country.

Uber by the cities: earnings

Also in the report was a breakdown of median earnings per hour by city. An important caveat here is that these are gross pay numbers and, therefore, they do not take into account the costs of driving a Taxi or an Uber. If you’d like to read a quick critique of the paper’s statement that “the net hourly earnings of Uber’s driver-partners exceed the hourly wage of employed taxi drivers and chauffeurs, on average,” read this. However, I will not join this discussion and instead focus only on gross pay numbers since costs are indeed unknown.

earnings

Data source: Hall and Krueger (2015). Uber earnings data from October 2014. Taxi earnings data from May 2013. Visualization made using ggplot2.

According to the report’s information, NYC Uber drivers take in the highest gross earnings per hour ($30.35), followed by SF drivers ($25.77). These are also the same two cities in which the traditional cabbies make the most, however while NYC taxi counterparts make a few dollars more per hour than those in other cities, the NYC Uber drivers make more than 10 dollars per hour more than Boston, Chicago, DC, and LA Uber drivers.

Endnote

There is no doubt that the modern taxi experience is different from the one that I once cataloged in my stout, spiral notebook. Sure, Uber drivers are younger than their conventional cabbie counterparts. They are more often female and more often white. They are more likely to talk to you and tell you about their other jobs or interests. But, the nature of the taxi industry is changing far beyond the scope of the drivers. In particular, information that was once unknown (who took a cab ride with whom and when?) to those not in possession of a taxi notebook is now readily accessible to companies like Uber. Now, this string of recorded Uber rides is just one element in an all-encompassing set of (technologically recorded) sequential occurrences that can at least partially sketch out a skeleton of our lived experiences…No pen or paper necessary.

Bonus: a cartoon!
uberouterspace

The New Yorker Caption Contest for this week with my added caption. The photo was too oddly relevant to my current Uber v. Taxi project for me to not include it!

 Future work (all of which requires access to more data)
  • Investigate whether certain age groups for Uber are dominated by a specific race, e.g. is the 18-39 group disproportionately white while the 40+ group is disproportionately non-white?
  • Request data on gender/race breakdowns for Uber and Taxis by city
    • Looking at the racial breakdowns for NYC would be particularly interesting since the NYC breakdown is likely very different from that of cabbies throughout the rest of the country (this data is not available in the Taxicab Fact Book)
  • Compare characteristics by ride-sharing service: Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar
  • Investigate distribution of types of cars driven by Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar (Toyota, Honda, etc.)
Code

All data and R scripts needed to recreate these visualizations are available on my “UbervTaxis” Github repo.


© Alexandra Albright and The Little Dataset That Could, 2016. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts, accompanying visuals, and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Alex Albright and The Little Dataset That Could with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.